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The Poetics Of Death: Intimations And Illusions
Lawrence Kimmel
“…at bottom, no one believes in his own death—or
to put the same thing in another way, in the
unconscious everyone of us is convinced of his own
immortality.”
--Sigmund Freud,
“Thoughts on War and Death”
I
From whom shall we learn about death—that is, death
itself, the intimacy of our own death? From biologists,
priests, physicians, psychologists, philosophers, poets? Or
from the aged, the dying, the terminally ill? And in relation
to what? Self, others; body, mind, soul, world? And with
respect to what? Acceptance, denial, reassurance? Surely all
the above—understanding the enigma of death at any depth
requires whatever assistance we can get. It is equally
important to acknowledge, however, that the context and
occasion of our asking is not incidental to what we can
finally learn. In the most general way it is arguably from the
acute insights and particularized expressions of poets that we
best come to understand the name and nature of death. The
poetic focus of consciousness is on the thing itself—on the
consciousness of what a thing means. But first it must
become a thing; which is to say that the nature of what is
unknown becomes embodied in its naming, and the field of
its meaning is discovered therein. But it is only the field of
its meaning that is available in the case of death: the most we
can hope for is some hermeneutic understanding of the
mystery in which it remains embedded.
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In speaking of the poetics of death I have in mind a process
of philosophy which incorporates the perception of the poet.
Poiesis, “to make”, is at the heart of this endeavor of
imagination; following Heidegger’s analysis, poiesis is a
making space in which meaning emerges and through which
truth (aletheia) comes to presence. The dialectical result of
this philosophical poetics is a focused inquiry in which one
comes to understand in an acute form what it is he already
knows (Plato on method, Heidegger on death) and through
this existential dialectic, becomes who he is (Kierkegaard on
existence.)
In the poetics of the old testament, one of the many points
of understanding the story of Eden is that the soul of Man
can have no garden without a snake—a presence which is
hidden, dangerous, seductive, secret, evil… Recall that the
choice in Eden was mortality—i.e. to become a humanbeing. Man becomes a conscious creature in time and death
becomes the definitive limit of his existence. Embodied in
this myth is a primal recognition that alive we are strangers
unto ourselves; that whatever meaning there is to our own
existence ultimately is beyond us—that death is the final and
finally irresolvable riddle of life well beyond the promised
knowledge of good and evil. This is not quite so in practical
terms of course: one may resolve the riddle of death by
dissolving the mystery—the strategy of the Stoics. Or, one
may introduce a Master Riddle Solver as an addendum to the
Stoic idea that death is nothing, in which death becomes
rather a transitory abstraction between mortality and
immortality. But the Deus ex Machina only postpones the
problem of a solution so far as consciousness is concerned.
One may be convinced and so become habituated to the idea
of immortal life—a denial of death and/or a belief in ‘a
resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come’
and this pragmatic override of consciousness may indeed
bring comfort in the face of the unknowable, but the riddle of
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death continues to gnaw at the edges of our most quiet
moments.
At the very least an adequate understanding of our own
death requires that we remain acutely aware of the mystery
of life, and so requires the focus of the poet whose particular
genius is to touch the face of the mysterious and leave it
unchanged. Why poets? Poetry is engaged in the making of
meaning, and in the case at hand, the making of space within
which the meaning of death becomes intimate, becomes real,
becomes…mine. We do not want death explained; we want
rather to understand the mystery of its meaning. Wisdom is
not in finding an explanation which will satisfy another, but
of discovering and unfolding a word, a name, a meaning
which finds resonance with one’s own life.
The power of words: what is in a name—“love, death,
truth, beauty, justice..?” Words as such and in a primal sense
are occasions that open up understanding to the mystery of
existence. Some words more than others, obviously: so the
challenge of poetic discourse is to probe the intimate and
shared mystery of life and death through a primal naming
that seeks to arrest for a kairic moment the current of
existence. Words constitute a distance from the ongoing flux
that otherwise carries captive each living moment into
oblivion and this distance allows a doubling of existence in
which we are enabled to understand that we exist, that we are
live, and that we will die. It is the space of consciousness
within this doubling that the paradox of existence grows into
mystery, and it is that within and for which poetry strives for
expression. There are no experts on death, however, any
more than on life, or truth, or beauty. The poet’s voice is
always that of an amateur, whose hands are empty of an
instrument of surety. It is a voice which at its best provides a
wisdom of intimacy which she brings to the common and
deeper concerns of existence.
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II
Aside from the figurative humor about Death and Taxes,
only the literal certainty of death remains: the one certainty
in life is death—not love, not truth, not justice, not
redemption… So in one sense we are as certain of our death
as we are of our life. They are two sides of the same coin of
existence. Life and death are limiting concepts of individual
existence; life can be short or long while death can only be
final but together they are easy or difficult, pleasurable or
painful and for the individual both are absolute. Life and
death as different and definitive aspects of existential
certainty are a common pairing in philosophy as well as
poetry. Whatever Descartes’ prior and ensuing doubts about
things generally, the Cogito captures the immediacy and
certainty of individual existence. Consciousness and life are
thus jointly immanent, but this is realized only upon
reflection and this reflection brings with it the parallel
certainty of death. “What is life?” is no simpler question
than “What is death?” and the deep sense of connection
between these two poles of existential certainty constitutes
the imaginative ground of poetic insight.
For the individual, consciousness is life, but this same
consciousness is an awareness however repressed or remote
of death. Freud’s analysis of consciousness argues that it has
no clear acknowledgement of an ending; however this is not
to say that we are unaware that our existence is being toward
death (Heidegger.) Being in death, just as being-in-life are
two ways of expressing the same existence in time. Freud’s
analysis of death is unusual in that the contrast in his account
of the dynamics of consciousness is not a confluence of life
and death, but of love and death: Eros and Thanatos.
Freud’s (late) idea in developing this pair of primal instincts
is that they seem to hold operational dominion in terms of
emotional life and development as elemental drives of the
organism itself: “Organism” is already greatly transformed
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in the case of homo-sapiens, however, so that its range
includes not only physiological but psychological—moral
and spiritual—dimensions. Love and death as elemental
instincts are functional in human consciousness at the point
of first awareness. That is, with the birth of consciousness in
Man come the combinatory features of the paradox
life/death. It may be important to acknowledge that ‘lower’
forms of animate life possess similar capacities—in the
higher primates there is evidence of grieving, for example a
gorilla may pine away at the death of a mate or offspring.
Whether or not it can be aware of the accompanying
paradox, the rising creature arguably has an intimation of the
intimate connection between its own life and death.
The insistence in literature that only man dies remains an
elemental focus of the poetic, as in Yeats’ familiar lines from
his poem “Death”:
Nor dread nor hope attend/ A dying animal;
A man awaits his end/ Dreading and hoping all…
He knows death to the bone/ Man has created death.
The attribution to human beings of the singular capacity of
knowing that she is going to die becomes the touchstone of
the poetic celebration of life. That this awareness of life in
human beings is at the same time and always the awareness
of not-life, death, gives life a fullness and depth it would
otherwise lack. There is an irony in this awareness of death
as the end of existence and also the end of consciousness:
death as a presence in consciousness is the most secret and
intimate fact of psychic life, but as an event will in the end
be not experienced as such. The commonly cited claim,
usually stated as a logical impossibility is that one can no
more experience his own death than he can jump over his
own shadow. I am arguing, however, that in terms of
consciousness I do experience death, the death which is
mine. In the relevant sense, death is no more an event for the
individual than is his life. We say easily enough that one
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experiences her own life, but notice that this is a peculiar
expression. Compare “I experience my own speech, I
experience my own thinking.” Does this mean anything
more than acknowledging the necessary awareness that ‘I
speak, I think?’ We might rather say that experience is life
and life experience and acknowledge the tautology.
The fact that human reflection is a conceptual doubling of
ourselves, however, means that we can not only do things,
but can attend to and reflect on what we are doing, so it is as
if we were split into two persons, one observing or critical of
the other. The parallel with life and death is not that anyone
would say that experience is death or equate the two in this
same way, but the question remains whether
consciousness/experience/life must include death. If life and
death arrive in consciousness (or with consciousness)
together, then death is in and with me as much and as long as
life is in me. To the extent I am my life—the limits and
substance of my consciousness—I am also my death. As
temporal creatures consciousness is a factor of time, so that
human beings are in life, in the world, and in consciousness
all at the same time and in the same way. And it is in the
same way that in living we are dying: as we are in life, then
we are also in death. Consciousness comprehends both,
whether Freud is right about these as primal instincts or not.
That we are anxious about our own life is an
acknowledgment that we are haunted by the certainty of our
own death.
There is an odd disconnect between knowledge and belief
that occurs in the question of my own death. As death is the
one thing about which we are certain (taxes however
predictable can be avoided, while death holds dominion over
individual life) there is that important and residual sense in
which I cannot imagine it, as in the opening citation from
Freud. In this sense I know I’m going to die, but I don’t
believe it. Descartes and Russell are curious places to begin
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this puzzle and the unraveling of paradox, but it is familiar
ground. ‘The cat is on the mat, but I don’t believe it’ is
Russell’s paradigm of nonsense. To be cognitively aware of
the cat on the mat entails belief: If I know the cat is on the
mat, I cannot not believe it. But this is not the case with
death. ‘I know I am going to die (that I am dying), but I
don’t believe it’ is curiously intelligible if in order to believe
it, I must be able to imagine it. Is it that imagination balks at
the prospect of its own demise? Something more than this, I
think. Descartes’ Cogito illustrates the point in another way
if we take it not as a deduction but as an equivalence in
which the “ergo” is eliminated—Cogito, Sum: I think, I am.
I cannot think my own death; in imagining the world without
me, I am still imagining and here is the conundrum: it is an
imagining necessarily of an existential fiction. The result is
that I am quite certain that I am going to die, I simply cannot
imagine it. I can believe it as a result of my knowledge of
the world and its ways, but I cannot believe it in the sense of
an independent cognition of my non-existence. This is the
sense in which I am my life as I am my world. Even so, and
this is the juncture of the uncanny: imagination carries with
it the emptiness of what it is not—death.
III
Heidegger puts it that Dasein is always a being toward
death, but once again as with Freud, so understood death is
not an experienced terminus, not an event. The point rather
describes the process of human-being as consciousness
aware of its own contingency. From the perspective of a life
narrative, thinking of our lives as a space between natality
and fatality parallel to the auto-bio-graphy—the self writing
out of one’s own life--abstracts time into space and
configures life on a progressive scale or graph:
beginning/middle/end —birth/life/death. We record births as
events, of course, as we record deaths as events. But as
independent events they are not a part of the ongoing current
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of consciousness that is my life. It is only later, of course,
that I reflect on my birth—that is achieve an acute awareness
that I am, and this existential awareness brings with it the
corresponding awareness that I might not have been, and
indeed an acknowledgment that I will not be. However
much consciousness balks at this contraction, death itself is
rooted in the genuine awareness of my own existence.
Heidegger persuasively argues that we are not only beings
toward death but equally beings-in-death—that death is with
us from the very arche of our individuated being. As a mere
happening or event, death is the routine if sorrowful
acknowledgment by someone concerning some other person.
It is only in realizing my death in the awareness of my life
that makes my death finally absolute and completes the
paradox of human existence.
Given this focus we must attend the detail of consciousness
of death. I can be interested in the life and death of others in
much the same way as my own—of the preciousness and
contingency of their existence only in so far as I share a
consciousness with them. The event of their death—that is,
death considered as an event, a fact—is of interest to me in
the sense that consciousness no longer shared—either of life
or death.
Apart from the abstractions and speculations about our
common lives and deaths, Love and Death remain the staples
of consciousness and the ground of philosophical thought in
the poetic creation of cultural life. In one of Freud’s
incidental essays, “The Uncanny”, he refers to the
consciousness of death as a primitive and uncanny feeling
and remarks that there has been no emotional change in the
attitude toward death since earliest times. Elsewhere he
remarks that Silence, Solitude, Darkness are elements in the
production of infantile morbid anxiety from which the
majority of human beings have never become quite free.
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Such is the human condition that only Man knows what it is
to die, knows that he is going to die, and so only for man is
there death in life. Heidegger’s now familiar description of
human-being as being-toward-death, in terms of individual
human consciousness makes it equally true to say that
human-being is being in death, being in time; consciousness
is a being conscious of mortality. Recall Nietzsche’s line
concerning that moment in the quiet alone in the darkest
night when all the usual business of life has fallen away: we
are left to wonder about our own existence and are met with
only a deepening silence.
IV
There is a grasshopper on the screen as I look out the
window. It has been in the exact same spot since yesterday
morning. It is clearly dead; it is just there. It came to its final
moments there for whatever reason. There was life in it, and
it is no longer there. And how is it different with my life?
We make a great deal of our lives, and so make a paramount
issue of death as well. When all is said and done it is surely
a matter only of human perspective and individual concern.
As human beings we have a choice to be as indifferent about
our death as we are of the absence of life in that grasshopper.
Recall Hume’s remark that from the standpoint of reason—
that is, in the absence of sentiment—I no more care about the
life and death of something or someone than the scratching
of my little finger. The problem is that such an indifference
to death seems to require a similar attitude toward life, which
constitutes a pathological perversion of human-being itself.
Heidegger’s familiar description of human-being centers in
‘care’ or ‘concern’ for the same reason, and Rilke’s poetic
expression in Duino Elegies echoes the same point:
Why, then have to be human?
Because everything here/ Vanishing so quickly,
seems to need us…
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To have been here once/ To have been at one with the
earth—
This is beyond undoing.
We noted at the outset that the occasion of the asking about
the question of death—young or old, well or ill, in the joyful
embrace of strength, or weary of life’s demands—will make
a difference in what one can hope to learn from the question.
We should note also that a sense for the poetics of the
question also makes a difference. Robert Frost’s poetry as in
the following from “Acquainted with the Night” has often a
contextual sense of the depth of such questions:
I have walked out in rain/ outwalked the furthest city
light
Stood still and stopped the sound of feet / When far
away an interrupted cry
Came …not to call me back or say good-bye/ And
further still at an unearthly height / A luminary clock
against the sky/ Proclaimed the time was neither
wrong nor right/ …I have been one acquainted with
the night.
While natality/mortality is the discursive dyad of human
existence, it is less a question of fact than of value whether
there need be an existential melancholy connected with this
linkage—whether as human beings we necessarily suffer
from an elemental death anxiety as Freud describes and as
Ernest Becker, for example, has elaborated it in The Denial
of Death. This idea taken as fact—that the reality (physical
or psychical?) of our condition is dismal—has the effect that
philosophers, poets, pundits, priests, and publicists have all
joined in the view that human beings require the distractions
of culture against the pressing and ubiquitous inevitability of
death. This anxiety in turn leads to an analysis of social
order and cultural perspective as providing an illusion of
meaning in an otherwise chaotic (human) universe. But
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chaos in this general and not technical sense is in fact a
derivative notion; it emerges only on the insistence that the
universe be compliable to human regulatory needs. From the
standpoint of physics of course, chaos itself becomes
incorporated in the larger scheme of regulatory description.
In the real world beyond the compensatory needs and
logistical schemes of human beings, however, there is only
continuous motion: hunger and satiety, exhaustion and
recovery: needs generated and satisfied (or not) occur at
every organic level. So it is not a fact but a perception that
induces and accompanies the pensive moments in human
consciousness when it focuses on death as an offense, an
obstacle, a sentence, an affront to consciousness. However
primal the anxiety, it is, for all that, optional not necessary in
our comportment toward the human condition.
The cultural activities of human kind may and have been
interpreted and analyzed as elaborately constructed
diversions from the primal anxieties of death and its
associated metaphors of silence, solitude and darkness, but
there is nothing finally compelling in this view. We have
still to determine how much weight to give to the idea that
“only man dies”, how much value to attach to an acute
awareness of the inevitable contingencies of existence. There
is both romance and depth to this awareness, but melancholy
and madness as well. Marlowe’s remark in Heart of
Darkness that ‘We live as we dream, alone.’ carries in
context an intimation of a lament to mean: we live as we
dream, and as we die—alone. But of course this is not really
true: we do not live or dream alone unless we pathologically
lose a sense of distinction between waking and dreaming;
even dreams are populated with the intrusive residuals of
others—we are no more alone there than in our waking
moments of consciousness. The configured isolation of
death is an existential construct of solipsism which has a
certain appeal to the dark side of our sensibilities, but it is a
construction no less, and hence optional. Must we, however,
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die alone? Is death that final distancing which separates us
into individuated creatures? It is tempting to think that death
is in this way singular and definitive of the human condition,
but this too is misleading. Many persons do not die alone:
In response to the battlefield cry ‘Once more into the breach
dear friends…’ the valiant go to face their death together.
Suicide pacts are attempts to avoid just this isolation—it is
impossible to forget images of people joining hands and
leaping to their death from the flaming ledges of the
crumbling twin towers during the horror of September 11th.
People die at home in beds, or in hospitals surrounded by
family and friends. And, of course, some indeed do die
alone, isolated, lonely, and miserable. On the psychic no
less than practical level, death is a matter of perspective and
perception, and the resolution of the puzzle of existence is a
matter of comportment, not simply concession.
Existential angst may but need not accompany the
realization that the human condition is being toward death.
The sometimes weary resignation this realization may bring
is recalled in Addie Bundren’s acceptance of the truth of her
father’s counsel in Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying that living is
just getting ready to stay dead a long time. Implied in
Addie’s resignation is also the common assent that there are
worse things than dying. That this is so and a common
belief—for example in the case of constant and irremediable
pain, or loss of sentience, or even deep humiliation—living
may become such that death is no longer a matter of dread,
but a consoling consummation devoutly to be wished. Or
not: once again the voice of the poetic embraces a range of
options to this comportment. At the cusp of death, there are
resources still; recall Yeats’ familiar lines that an old man is
but a paltry thing, a tattered coat upon a stick—unless soul
clap its hands and sing. Dylan Thomas’ counsel as if to his
father but speaking for himself and to all of us that wise men,
good men, wild men, grave men—none go gentle into that
good night, but rage, rage against the dying of the light. As
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Tennyson reminds us, the woods decay and fall, the vapors
weep their burden to the ground, Man comes to till the earth
and lie beneath, and after many a summer dies the swan.
Whether on the occasion of death the individual rages or
sings there is beauty in the realization of the fullness of his
existence.
There are, then, no facts that decide the issue of human
anxiety, whether of death or any other. If death anxiety is
primal, it none-the-less can be displaced by a simple
resolution to cease upon the midnight with no pain, no less
than an elaborately conceived scheme of human immortality
to counter despair. Having said all this, it is no more true of
ordinary language and sensibility than it is of theological
constructions that any of this does away with the riddle of
existence and the inevitability of death. Whatever we say,
whatever we discover in or about ourselves as human beings,
the mystery remains. Death is a phenomenon that focuses
consciousness on the paradox of human existence, and
whatever results from subsequent inquiry seldom gets
beyond an acute recognition of this mystery. Wittgenstein
remarked that it is not how the world is, but that it is, that is
the mystery. The same can be said about life, of course, and
about death. There is no small revelation in this recognition
that at the heart of the human condition we discover not
simply a primal anxiety concerning death, but a mystery that
quickens the imagination and deepens the soul. Acceptance
of this elemental mystery and a poetic reconciliation with the
paradox suggest that the secret of any genuine resolution to
the question of death will be found less in the distractions of
abstract immortality, than in simple acts of mortal
fulfillment.
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